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This paper examines the effect of community zoning regulations on allocations and welfare
in a two-community model. Each community uses a local property tax to finance public
education. Tax rates are determined by majority vote within each community, and individuals
choose in which community to reside. We study exogenously imposed zoning regulations as well
as the case where the regulator is endogenously determined by majority vote. Our analysis
indicates that a number of outcomes arc theoretically possible. Several interesting results emerge
from simulations of the model. Although zoning tends to make the rich community more
exclusive, this need not increase the quality of education in the rich community relative to the
poor community. Welfare effects are not monotone in income; some lower income individuals
benefit and some higher income individuals are made worse off when zoning is introduced.
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1. Introduction
A striking feature of US public education, as illustrated in Table lA, is
the large disparity that exists across communities in spending per student.
Any explanation of this outcome and any attempt to change it must contend with
two factors. First, US public education is financed to a large degree by
local property taxes.' Second, the process by which individuals choose where
to reside results in great differences in average income across communities,
even within the same metropolitan area. The goal of this paper is to examine
the role that one pervasive institutional feature in the US--community zoning
regulation—-plays in-producing this outcome via its interaction both with the
property tax and with the creation of communities that differ with respect to
average income.
Our analysis starts by providing a benchmark of a two-community model
without zoning in which each community taxes the housing property of its
residents and uses the proceeds to fund public education. Tax rates within
each community are chosen by majority voting. Individuals differ only in
income and derive utility from housing, the consumption of a private good, and
the quality of public education they obtain. Individuals decide in which
community to reside. All equilibria of this model in which the quality of
education varies across communities are stratified, i.e., they are
characterized by the existence of a rich community with a high tax rate and
high spending per student, and a poor community with a lower tax rate and
10n average 45% of spending on primary and secondary public education is
financed by local taxes.—2—
lower spending per student. All individuals in the rich community have income
st least as great ss those in the poor community.
We then examine the effects on equilibrium allocations and welfare that
result when the rich community imposes a zoning regulation. The only zoning
regulation we examine is one that requires individuals to purchase a minimum
level of housing as a condition for residence in the community. We analyze
both an exogenously imposed zoning regulation as well as one endogenously
determined by a process of majority vote.
At a general level the analysis suggests a wide range of poasible
outcomes, ao we explore some of them via simulation. As might be expected, in
all of our simulations. ;e find that the introduction of zoning results in the
rich community becoming more exclusive (i.e. smaller and richer) and the
poorer community becoming larger. The outflow of the least wealthy
individuals of the rich community from that community into the poor one
necessarily increases average income in both communities.
Several interesting results are associated with the change in equilibrium
community composition. We begin with the implications for welfare. Whereas
there may be a general presumption that zoning benefits the rich at the
expense of the poor, the actual welfare effects tend to be more subtle than
this. While indeed zoning tends to make the poorest individuals worse off and
the richest indviduala better off, the highest income individuals that reside
in the poor community (in the no-zoning equilibrium) are also made better off,
and the lowest income individuals that reside in the rich community )in the
no-zoning equilibrium) are in fact made worse off. Of the individuals that
actually move as a result of zoning, those with the highest income are made—3—
worse off; those with the lowest income sre msde better off. Thus, it is the
welfsre effects of zoning on those individuals that sre somewhere in the
"middle" of the distribution that are the most complex. This is due to the
effect on individual welfare of the interaction of two factors Ci) the
increase, at esch tax rate, of each community's property base, and (ii) the
existence of a new, wealthier median voter in each community. In general, the
effect of zoning on the absolute gap in spending per student between
communities is ambiguous.
Finally, zoning allows the rich community to be characterized both by
higher spending per student and by lower tax rates, in contrast with the no-
zoning model which required both equilibrium spending per student and the tax
rate to be higher in the rich community in equilibrium. This is significant
since in reality there is not a perfect correlation between average income and
tax rates across communities.
Endogenizing the level of zoning significantly complicates the analysis
since it is not possible to identify the outcome of majority vote )ifit
exists)with the level of zoning preferred by the individual with median
income. We provide two examples where equilibrium exists but the individual
with median income is no longer the decisive voter in the rich community. The
effects of the endogenously chosen zoning level on equilibria follow naturally
from the comparative statics exercises of the exogenous zoning model.
Although various aspects of zoning have been studied extensively, there
has been little work done on zoning in the context of publicly provided goods
in multi-community models.2 In Hamilton )1s75), communities use property
2See Pagodzinski and Sass )1990,1991) for reviews of the theoretical and
empirical literatures on zoning.—4—
taxes to finance locally publicly provided goods. In this model, communities
are formed costlessly.3 Hence, endogenous zoning expressed as a minimum
housing requirement allows individuals to perfectly separate themselves out by
income and thus delivers, not surprisingly, an efficient allocation of
resources. Durlauf (1992) presents a dynamic community model in which
communities provide a local public good——education——and impose minimum income
restrictions as a requirement for residence in a community (there is no
housing market) .Hisanalysis, however, is concerned exclusively with the
long-run properties of the income distribution in a framework with local and
global peer effects. Henderson (1980) and Epple, Romer and Filimon (1988)
analyze the endogenous choice of zoning regulations in multi-community models.
Their focus, however, is on implications for the pattern of land use given the
existence of residents concerned about the characteristics of potential
entrants into the community. There are no publicly provided goods in this
model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies a multicommunity
model with no zoning. Section 3 introduces zoning into the rich community and
analzyes the comparative statics implications of different exogenous levels of
zoning.Section 4 endogenizes the zoning restriction and section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
In this section we study a model of two communities with no zoning which
will serve as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis in which zoning is
our model we do not allow new communities to be formed (e.g. there is
an infinite cost to forming new communities) .Realityundoubtedly lies
between these two extremes.—5—
introduced. Multi—community models have been analyzed by several authors.
Westhoff (1978) and Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984) examine the existence of
equilibrium in multi-community models with local publicly provided goods.
Epple and Romer (1991) analyze redistribution by local governments in a multi-
community setting. Fernandez and Rogerson (1992) examine educational policies
in a two-community model in which education is publicly provided at the
community level. de Eartolome (1991) and Benabou (1991) study different
versions of a multi—community model with peer effects.
There is a continuum of individuals with identical preferences given by
u(c,h) +v(q) (1)
where c is consumption of a private good, h is the amount of housing purchased
by the individual, and q is the quality of public education. We assume that
u(c,h) is twice continuously differentiable, c,ncave, with u(O,h(=- Yh, and
that c and h are normal goods. Individuals differ with respect to their
endowed income y whose distribution is characterized by a continuous density
function g(y) with support [y,y(, aO. We normalize the mass of individuals
to equal one.
There are two communities (indexed by j=1,2) .Eachcommunity is
characterized by a proportional tax rate t on the value of housing and by a
quality of public education. We let c be the numeraire and p be the relative
(pre-tax) price of housing. For simplicity we assume that p is constant and
equal in both communities.4 Each individual must choose a community in which
to live. The budget constraint faced by an individual in community jis
4A variable p would introduce additional complications without increasing
the insights available from the analysis.—6-.
c+ir.h=y (2)
where ir1=p(i+t1)
Given residence in community j, the indirect utility of an individual
with income y is
V(sr1,q.,y) =u(y—ir.h(irr.,y),h(n.,y))+v(q.) (3)
where h(irr1,y) is the individual's housing demand function.
The quality of education is assumed to equal the amount of spending per
resident within the community.5 Thus,
q. =tph. (4)
where h. is the average amount of housing consumed in community j (henceforth
denoted C.), Le.
- H. J.h(s. ,y)dy
N. N.
N1 equals the mass of individuals located in C, N1 ia the total amount of
housing purchased in C, and .1 indicates the integral over those individuals
that reside in C.
We assume that the game among individuals and between communities is
played in the following fashion. In the first stage individuals
5Linearity of q is chosen solely for simplicity of exposition; it can
easily be extended to increasing concave functions of expenditures per
student. The relation between expenditures and quality has been the subject
of much controversy. See Card and Krueger (1992) for a review of this debate
and evidence in favor of a positive effect of spending per student on quality.—7—
simultaneously choose a community in which to live. Once this choice is made,
they are unable to move in any subsequent etage. In the second stage, each
community's tax rate is (simultaneously) decided upon by majority vote within
that community and individuals consume the private good, purchase housing, and
obtain education.
Denote the equilibrium tax and quality outcomes in each community by
)t,q) and )t,q) .Takingthese outcomes as given, therefore, in any
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the above game each individual must reside in
the community in which her utility is highest. Note that, when voting,
individuals are aware of the effect of different choices of tax rates on the
groaa price of housing ,r and on the quality of education (via the community's
budget constraint as expressed in equations 4 and 5)
It is difficult to characterize the equilibria to this game without
imposing an additional assumption on preferences. This is done in Assumption
AsaumotiOn 1: S =ucch)1_irhy)
+uchhhy
+urhyc 0
The significance of this assumption is eaaily understood by noting that




6This is in contrast with Rose-Ackerman (1979) and Epple. Filimon, and
Romer (1984) who assume that voters do not take into account the effect of tax
changes on the aggregate housing stock demanded in a community.
7westhoff (1977) provides the first use of this kind of (single-crossing)
condition to characterize equilibria in a multi—community model. Different
versions of this condition have been employed by Roberts (1977) ,Epple,
Filimon and Romer (1984) ,andEpple and Romer (1991)—8—
Thus, Assumption 1 guarantees that the slope of an individual's indifference
curve (in q—t space) is increasing in initial income (i.e. ucph is decreasing
in y) .Thepower of this assumption to characterize equilibria is apparent in
Proposition 1. First, though, we establish that in equilibrium no community
can be empty.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium no community is empty.
aQQ:Ifa community were empty then an individual with y=y could, by moving
into that community, obtain the same quality of education there at a lower tax
rate since the that community would possess a strictly higher average housing
demand than the other community. Hence, this individual would be made
strictly better off than before. Consequently, the initial allocation could
not have been an equilibrium.
Pr000sition 1: If in equilibrium communities have different qualities of
education, then:
(U (q,t>>(q,t)
(ii) The income of every individual in C1 is at least as great as that of any
individual in C2,
where C1 is arbitrarily defined as the community with the larger q*•
Qgj: )i) If q>q then necessarily t>t otherwise all individuals
prefer C1 to C2.(ii) By Assumption 1, if an individual with income y
prefers (q,t) to (q,t) then so does every individual with income
fly. I
Thusthese equilibria have individuals stratified into communities by
initial income. C1 will be characterized by a higher tax rete, a higher
quality of education and by higher income residents than C2. We refer to an—9—
equilibrium with these properties as a stratified equilibrium. Hereafter we
will focus only on those equilibria in which the qualities of education are
different across communities. -
Pr000aition2: Majority vote within a community results in t equal to a tax
rate preferred by the voter whose income is median within the community.
Proof: This follows directly from Assumption 1. The argument is illustrated
in Figure 1. Letbe the median income in the community. Consider the tax-
quality possibility frontier faced by the median voter. Let z*=(q*,t*( be the
(q,t( pair preferred by the median voter. Any other (q,t( pair that lies in
the ares A (that is to the left of the median voter's indifference curve
through z and with t>t( will be rejected in favor of z by at least 50% of
the voters (i.e. at least by all voters with ys'( .Similarlyany (q,t( pair
that lies in area S (that is to the left of the median voter's indifference
curve and with tct*( will be rejected in favor of z by at least 50% of the
voters (i.e. at least by all voters with ysç'( .Anypoint in C must lie
outside the tax-quality frontier. Hence z is the majority vote outcome.8
All potential stratified equilibria can be parametrized by the level of
income of the "boundary" individual, wherethe latter defines a partition
of the population int the two communities such that all reside in C1 and
all reside in C2. We define W(y( to equal the utility of an individual
with income that resides in C given the partition defined by and the
tax rate and quality that result from majority vote given such a partition.
8spple and Homer (1991( use this reasoning very nicely to show that even
if individuals were free to move between communities in response to different
tax-quality outcomes, majority voting must result in the preferred tax rate of
the median voter.—10—
If a stratified equilibrium exists there must be an individual with
who is indifferent between the two communities, i.e.
(fl
To check whether the allocation specified by y=y is an equilibrium, an
additional necessary (and sufficient given (7)) condition is t>t since
Assumption 1 then ensures that all preferC1 over C2 and the opposite for
To trace out the utility of the boundary individual as a function of
we differentiate W (y( with respect to This yields
=(P(j((dE/dyb)] +v'((ôq/Ot.( (dE./dy(+)ãq./öy)( (8)
where E indicates the tax rate chosen by majority vote within the community
with an allocation of the population as specified byi.e. is the
preferred tax rate of the median voter in community j given a boundary
individual Note that q=q(t,y(
Thus, to establish the properties of the curves we need to determine
how and q react to changes in There are two important effects at
work when increases: )i) The income distribution in both communities is
shifted rightward so that the median voter corresponds to an individual with
greater income than previously and, (ii) The average housing consumed in each
community increases at each ir.Consequently,evaluating the effect of a
marginal increase in corresponds to )i) evaluating how the preferred tax
rate (and hence quality) changes with an increase in the income of the median—11—
voter, ceteris paribus, and (ii) evaluating how a given median voter'a
preferred tax rate (and hence quality) changea with an increase in average
housing consumption.
Given a distribution of income within a community,thepreferred tax rate
of an individual with income y is found by maximizing (3) with respect to t
subject to the community's budget constraint as specified in (4) .Thefirst
order condition for an interior maximum is:
—uph(s,y) +v')aq/ât) 0 (9)
where the community subscript is omitted.
Recalling' that the identity of the median voter is a function of the
equation that implicitly defines the median voter's () preferred tax rate E
asa function of is thus:
R)yt ) =—u)c)y)—;h);c)Y))h);c)y)HphGc)y))+ v')&g/Ot) =0(10)
Using the implicit function rule on (10) to solve for the effect of a marginal
increase in on t yields:
dt —pS )dc'/dy) +(v"tp)Oh/Oy))ôqIôt) +v'pI )dh/Oy) +E)S2h/c3tOyb) =
— ÔR/OE
(11)
where S is defined in Assumption 1 and aR/at=Iucch)h+shm)_uchhhs_uchs)pO +
v')aq/ôt)2+v' )82q/0t2, .Inorder for the second order condition for an
interior maximum to be satisfied dR/dt must be negative. The following two
assumptions are sufficient to ensure that this condition is satisfied.
Assumption 2: u(c,h) is concave in it,i.e.,ucch)h+lrhs)_uchhhs_uchs 0.—l2-
Assumption 3: q(t,y) is concave in t.
Hence the denominator in (11) is positive The numerator is more
difficult to sign. As argued previously, it is possible to decompose (11)
into two distinct reactions to the marginal increase in For a given
median voter, the latter's reaction to an increase in average housing demand
(brought on by the marginal increase in is denoted by (at/oyb) Ic. and is
equal to
v' (q/y) (Oq/ôt) +
(12)
Noting that and that a(aq/at)/ay p[(a/oy) +
E(2h/otay)],it is easy to see that the numerator of this expression
corresponds to the terms that appear within the curly brackets in (11)
Furthermore, oh/ayb>O and aq/at=ph+tp2h, also is strictly positive since
otherwise the median voter (and indeed all individuals) could be made better
off by a marginal decrease of the tax rate. After some further manipulation




with o2h1/atay=p and 2h2/atoy =
_p[h5_h(7r,y)]g(y)/N2.Note that these last two expressions are positive
if h,>O. Hence, if in addition -v"q/v'sl, then the numerator in (12) is—13—
strictly positive and ôE/Oy>O. That is, a given median voter's preferred
tax rate increases with
The second effect, &.e. the effect on a community's tax rate due to a new
median voter with a higher income than previously (for the same given average
housing demand at each itasbefore( is, by Assumption 1, to increase the tax
rate. This effect is captured by the first term in expression (ll( and is
strictly positive.





If dE/dy>0 then necessarily q must increase. If, however, dt/dycO then
the effect on quality is ambiguous.10




The last two terms in this expression are always positive. In addition, note
that _ucph+v' (Oq/ât( (evaluated at y=y( is, by Assumption 1, negative for j=1
(since ycy1( and positive for j=2 (since y>y2) .Thus,if dE/dyb is
positive, expression (l5( is positive for j=2 and ambiguous for j=l. Of
91f u(c,h( is homothetic then ôE/8y (for s given '(ispositive
(negetive) if -v"q/v' is less (greeter) than one. Furthermore, the dq/dy
(for a given median voter) is positive regerd'ees of the sign of
-101fu is homothetic then dq/dy is positive regardless of the sign of
dt/dy.—14—
course, if dE/dyb<O snd dq/dy>O thsn (15) is necessarily positive for
j=l,2.
In general, as our preceding discussion indicstes, it is impossible to
sign (15) without imposing further restrictions on preferences. In sll our
simulations, however, we found dwj/dYb to be positive. Furthermore, without
additional assumptions it is impossible to guarantee existence or uniqueness
of equilibrium.11 In our simulations we restrict our choice of utility
functions and parameter values such that equilibrium exists and is unique.
Figure 2 depicts a possible configuration of the W() curves.
Equilibrium id given by
3.The Model with Exogenous Zoning
This section studies the effects on welfare and allocations of an
exogenously imposed zoning regulation in C1. The regulation requires all
individuals residing in C1 to purchase at least M>O units of hnusing. Section
4 then studies the case where the level of required housing purchases is
endogenously determined. There are two reasons for considering an exogenously
imposed H. First, once lot sizes have been determined and houses built it may
be difficult to change a zoning regulation. Hence, zoning regulations in
place today may reflect decisions that were made previously. Second, the
analysis of exogenously imposed zoning and the effect on various variables of
changes in its level provides insights for the analysis of an endogenous N.
introduction of a local housing supply function that endogenizes
--the price of a unit of housing in C.--generates simple conditions that
ensure the existence of a stable stratilied equilibrium )see Fernandez and
Rogerson )1993)) .—15—
Zoning regulations are only introduced in C1, the wealthy community.
This asymmetry serves to highlight the possible effects of zoning regulations
on allocations across communities. A natural interpretation of this situation
ia that of a central city and its suburbs, where C1 corresponds to the suburb
and C2 represents the central city.
3.1 General Properties
In order to examine the effects of zoning on the equilibrium described in
section 2, we must first establish that our propositions regarding
stratification and the median voter continue tnhold.The following result
and two additional assumptions allow us to establish both.
Pr000sition 3: For a given allocation of individuals in s community and a
given H, dV(ir,q,y;H(/dt is continuous and increasing in y for y>irH.
Proof:Forindividuals for whom the housing constraint is binding, i.e.
h(n,y(cH, (but with strictly postive consumption of the private good).
dV/dt--u0pH÷v'3g/Ot which is increasing in y. For unconstrained individuals,
dV/dt-uph+v'Oq/ât which, by Assumption 1, is strictly increasing in y. Note
that these last two expressions are identical at the y level st which en
individual is just constrained (i.e. for y such that h)w,y)=M) .HencedV/dt
is a continuous increasing function of y. II
Ify/ircH then an individual with that level of income cannot afford to
purchase H units of housing et the given (after tax) price level. It is
assumed that in such a case the individual is forced to spend her entire
income on housing. This yields her V=-m end thus dv/dt=O fr alLy and tin
this range.—16—
Propostion 3 allows us, for any given H, to identify the tax rate chosen
in C with the preferred tax rate of the individual whose income is median in
the community. A statement and a proof of this is provided in the next
propositon. It is assumed throughout that an individual faced with a choice
between two tax rates each of which (because of the zoning constraint(
exhausts her entire income on housing, votes for the lowest of the two tax
rates.
Proposition 4: Majority voting in C1, at any given level of H, generates a tax
rate preferred by the median voter.
Proof: A tax rate t' greater than that preferred by the median voter (0)
will be blocked by those individuals with ys. To see this note that if the
median voter prefers £ to t' then f(dV(ir,g,;M(/dt(dt (integrated from £ to
t'( is negative. By Proposition 3, then, f(dV(a,q,y;M(/dt)dt is also negative
for all y such that Mcycç and is zero for those individuals with ysM.
Similarly, any tax rate t'smaller than £ will be rejected in favor of 0
since if f(dv(s,q,;H(/dt(dt (integrated from t' to 0) is positive, then (by
Proposition 4) S(dV(s,q,y;M(/dt(dt is necessarily positive for all y>. 1
Two things should be noted from the preceding propositiona. First, in
equilibrium yv7r1M since otherwise, by our assumption on preferencea, would
prefer C2 to C1 if residing in the latter implied zero consumption of the
private good. Second, note that the proof of Proposition 4 does not rely on
the indirect utility function being single-peaked with respect to t. This is
important since, as we show further on, V(.( is not neceasarily single—peaked.
In order to establish stratification in this model we need to impose two
additional conditions on preferences:—17—
Assumption 4: du)y-.wh,h)/dir a0.
Assumption 5: uCh a o.12
The significance of these assumptions will be made clear in the proof of the
next proposition.
Proposition 5: If in equilibrium both communities are non-empty and q'q,
then the equilibrium must be stratified, i.e. all individuals with income
above some cutoff level reside in C1 and the remainder reside in C2.
jgg: This argument is less straightforward than that employed in the proof
of Proposition 1 since now individuals may be constrained in C1. Suppose that
in equilibrium an individual with income y' is indifferent between both
communities. If that individual is unconstrained, normality of h implies that
no other individual in C1 is constrained and the result then follows from
Proposition 1.If, on the other hand, the indifferent individual is
constrained, there are two subcases to examine depending on whether t is
greater or smaller than t (note that y' must have strictly positive
consumption of the private good in C1 in both cases) .Wetake up each of
these possibilities in turn.
Ci). Suppose t>t. We want to show that individuals with income greater
than y' prefer C1 to C2. Note that the change in utility due to the increase






12Note that Assumptions 2 and 3 combined imply that nh is an increasing
function of it.—18—
Since 711>52 and M>h(s1,y'(, Assumptions 4 and S imply that the above condition
is met. Furthermore, since V(ir1,q1,y)-V(s2,q2,y)=fu0(y—ir1M,M)dy-fu0(y-
ir2h,h)dy >0, where the integral is from y' to y" and y" is defined as the
level of y such that h(s1,y)=M), these assumptions guarantee that all
constrained individuals with y>y' prefer C1 to C2. Note that in particular
Assumption 4 implies V(1T11,q1,y";M)aV(7rr2,q2,y"). Assumption 1 then ensures
that all individuals with y>y" also prefer C1.
(ii) Given zoning, sn equilibrium in which C1 possesses both a greater quality
and a tax rate is feasible. Since, absent the zoning constraint, all
individuals would prefer C1 to C2, it must be that y' is constrained in
equilibrium. In order for other constrained individuals with y>y' td prefer
C1 to C2, we require (as before) u0)y'—ir1N,M)>u0)y'-s2h,h) .Notethat
implies M>h)ir2,y'). Thus, for y' to be indifferent between the two
communities we must have c1=y'-ir1Mcc2=y'—ir2h)1r2,y'). Assumption S then
guarantees u0(y'—,r1M,M)>u0)y'—1r2h,h( snd similarly that
V)m2,q2,y)=fu0(y-ir1M,M)dy-5u0(y-n2h,h)dy >0 for any y euch that y'cycy".
Thus, all constrained individuals (with y>y') prefer C1 to C2 as do, of
course, all unconstrained individuals.
3.2 Preliminary Analysis
In order to examine how zoning and changes in the level of zoning affect
the equilibrium, we first turn to an analysis of the effect on the curves
of changes in N. Note first that only the N1 curve is affected by M and that
if, for a given allocation of individuals between communities, the
housing/consumption choice of any individual in C1 is affected by zoning, then—19—
so is Yb's. Furthermore, in order for the equilibrium with zoning to differ
from the no—zoning equilibrium, the restriction must be sufficiently large
that y is constrained by M.
We now define Wl)yb;M) as the utility of the b individual in C1 given a
zoning level of M in C1. W2(y) is defined as before. Differentiating




where the preferred tax rate of the individual with median income is now
indicated by t(yb;M) and quality is written as q(ty;M). Individual housing
demand, h)ir,y;M), now also depends on Wand is equal to h)ir,y) if the latter
is greater than or equal to M and is equal to M otherwise.
It is difficult to sign expression (16) .Todo so it is necessary to
examine the effect of changes in M on the median voter's preferred tax rate
and quality for a given value of b• Algebraically, E)y:M) solves:
Max u(y-sh,h) +v(q) (17)
t
When M=O, Assumptions 2 and 3 guarantee that this is a concave
maximization problem, but when M>O they are no longer sufficient since q is no
longer a concave function of t. In particular, q)t,y;W) has an inflection
point at the tax rste that separates two regions: one of low taxes in which no
individual is constrained end one of higher taxes such that at least some
individual is constrained. Thus, depending on the utility function, there is
no guarantee that the maximization program is concave.—20—
The first order condition for the preferred tax rate of the individual




Note that if h>M, then _Uc1T+Uh=O whereas if h=M then h5=0.
When the median voter chooses a tax rate such that she is unconstrained,
















Note that yc(5M) is defined as the income level such that h)y7r)=M.
As should be apparent from the definitions of A and B above, the sign of
aE/oM is ambiguous without further assumptions. It is straightforward to
show however, the implied quality increases with M independently of the effect
of M on t as long as q is locally concave in t at t. Clearly, if t
13The above discussion implies that the preferred tax rate may have a
point of discontinuity. The comparative statics results that follow are
obviously not valid at such a point.—21—
increases then so does g. If t decreases Assumption 2 implies that uch
decreases, whereas local concavity of g and the increase in N both imply that
Oq/Ot increases. Were q to decrease this would imply an increase in v', in
which case (18) cannot be satisfied. Thus, q must increase.
A similar exercise for a median voter that chooses t such that she is
constrained yields:
aE (ulruh]PMuP+ (p/N1) [v'A+v"E) —
OR/at
(20)
As before, the second order condition implies 3R/OtcO. Note that the
additional terms in the numerator of this expression as compared with (19) are
all negative. Thus it is quite likely that the effect of a marginal increase
in N is to increase the preferred tax rate of the median voter when the latter
is unconstrained and to decrease it when the median voter is constrained.
To illustrate the effect of zoning on tandg we simulate the model for
the following functional forms: u)c,h)=Nc°-l)÷)h°-l))/)3o) ,v)q)=)g1-1)/)3y)
and g(y)=a0+a1y, g(y)'o =1 and p=l. For this utility function u(0,h)=-r,
ucho. and Assumptions 1 snd 4 reduce to mc0.
Figure 3 examines the median voter's utility as a function of t for given
values of N (keeping constant) for two different sets of parameter values
of the utility function. In Example 1, m=-10 and y"1x104 whereas in Example
2, o-lxl04 and y=.5. In both cases y=20, a0=.1l08, and 5l=0055• We will
make continued use of these particular examples to illustrate various
properties of this model and hereafter refer to them as Example 1 and 2
respectively. For both examples in Figure 3, at the lowest value of N—22—
portrayed all individuala are unconatrained for all values of t indicated.
For all other values of M, the V(ir,q';M) curves coincide with the
unconstrained curve at sufficiently low tax rates and diverge from it as soon
as any individual becomes constrained.
Note that the patterns portrayed in Example 1 and 2 are different. All
the V(.) curves in Example 2 are double peaked. One peak corresponds to the
tax rate that maximizes utility for the unconstrained curve. The other occurs
where a large number of individuals (including the median voter) are
constrained. In this example the preferred tax rate is discontinuous at the
point at which the maximum switches from the first peak to the second peak.
In Example 1, on the other hand, the curves appear to be single peaked and
thus there is no discontinuity in t. In both cases, for small values of N,
E is equal to the tax rate that maximizes utility for the unconstrained
curve. For N sufficiently large, though, the optimum is attained at a lower
value of t but one sufficiently high that the median voter is constrained.
Figure 3A summarizes for Examples 1 and 2 t)yb;N) and g)ty;M) as a
function of N. As Eximple 1 shows, E and q need not follow the same pattern:
E can decrease even when the median voter is unconstrained while q continues
to increase. Example 2 has E and q moving in sync.
It should be clear that for sufficiently small values of N, Ot/ÔN=O
since the value of t that maximizes the median voter's utility remains
unchanged by small changes in N if no individual was constrained at the
previous preferred tax rate. As N continues to increase, it takes
progressively smaller tax rates for the median voter to be constrained and
this will shift the preferred value of t. To explain this behavior, note that—23—
for small values of H it takes far too large a t to completely eliminste the
free rider effect (i.e. to get all individuals with ycy to consume H units of
housing) .Hencethe preferred t in this range will either be the
unconstrained value of t or one that has only some individuals with yc
constrained. Increases in H allow the median voter to completely eliminate
the free rider problem at "reasonable" values of t (and, of course, also to
obtain greater quality at lower tax rates) .Hotealso that if t did not fall
once the median voter were constrained, higher values of H would impose
progressively greater disutility on that individual as consumption of the
private good would continue to decrease. Hence it is quite understandable
that once the median voter is constrained, further H increases tend to have
the effect of decreasing the preferred tax rate.
3.3 Equilibrium
The main questions of interest are: 1. How does zoning affect the
allocation of individuals between communities? 2. How does zoning affect the
equilibrium qualities of education in both communities? 3. How are
equilibrium taxes affected by zoning? And, most importantly, 4. How is
individual welfare affected by zoning?
Hot surprisingly given our previous discussion, the effect of an increase
in H on W1)y;H) is ambiguous. In all our simulations, however, W1(y;H) fell
for a marginal incresse in H in the vicinity of y.14 Hence, in all our
simulations an increase in H is associated with an increase in y(H)
14An example where W(y;H) increases for an interval of that does not
include y is for the parameter values of Example 2 for H=7.—24—
Figure 4 shows, for two exsrnples )psrsmeters are indicated on the
Figure) ,howthe equilibrium value of is affected by changes in N. Each N1
curve shown corresponds to a different value of N and is labeled accordingly.
Also shown is the N2 curve which, of course, is independent of N. For both of
these examples, increases in N have the effect of shifting the N1 curve
downwards, resulting in each case in progressively higher equilibrium values
of y, )i.e. y)N) is an increasing function of N) .Thusthe effect of
zoning in these examples is to increase the number of individuals that live in
C2 )and hence decrease the number of individuals in C1) .Despitethe
ambiguous nature of our theoretical result, this is not surprising. If y is
to differ as a result of zoning, it must be the case that at the t*(N) chosen
by the median voter, is constrained. Ceteris paribus, this has the effect
of making worse off.
Table 1 presents, for the same two examples aa Figure 4, the equilibrium
tax rates, qualities of public education, y, and the mean and median incomes
across communities as a function of different levels of N imposed in C1.
A few things should be noted from Table 1.First, as suggested by our
previous discussion of the effect on Eyb;r.U and q)t,y;N) of an increase in
N, equilibrium tax rates and quality in C1 are not generally monotonic
functions of N. Quality first increases and then decreases with N and the tax
rate behaves similarly )though not necessarily in sync) .InC2, the tax rate
and quality are both increasing functions of N.15 Again, the intuition
behind these results is easy to understand: The effect of a median voter with
15Theoretically it is possible for both taxes and quality to decrease.
For the utility function and the parameter values chosen, however, they must
increase as indicated in the footnote that follows equation (13)—25—
greater income is, ceteris paribus, to increase the tax rate (and hence
quality) .Theeffect of greater average housing (brought about by the
increase in y) for a given median voter, however, has ambiguous effects on
the tax rate and consequently on quality. It is interesting to note thst in
both examples the ratio of q to q decreases as M increases.
Lastly, note that as indicated by the last row in both examples, it is
possible for an equilibrium to result in C1 possessing not only a greater
quality of education but also a lower tax rate. A sufficiently high level of
zoning ensures that lower income individuals keep out due to the large
sacrifice in consumption of the private good that their residence in C1 would
entail.
The effect of zoning on individual welfare is quite interesting. Figures
S)a,b) and 6)a,b,c,d,e) show, at various levels of detail, the effect of
different values of N imposed in C1 on the welfare of individuals in both
communities for the same two examples as in Figure 4. At each N, for each
income level, individual utility has been calculated at the new equilibrium
allocations of individuals, given the new equilibrium quality and tax rate in
each community. In all cases the new level of y brought about by a change
in N can be discerned in the figures by the sharp increase in the slope of the
corresponding N1 curve.
In both of our examples, the effect of an N increase is to make the
poorest individuals worse off. Why is this? Note that in all cases the
effect of higher N is to increase t and q. If any residents in C2 sre to
be made worse off as a result of this, they must be the poorest ones since
these are, by Assumption 1, the least happy with a tax increase for a given—26—
quality increase. This is seen clearly in Figures 5(a) and 6(b). This
interval of poor individuals that reside in C2 and that prefer no zoning to
any level of zoning is followed by another income interval, likewise residents
of C2 for all levels of M, that prefer some level of zoning to no zoning.
These are individuals that have benefited from either one or both of the
following elements: )i) 5 new median voter that is closer to them in income
than was the case previously and, (ii) a greater average housing consumption
at each after-tax price than previously. Note, however, that within this
interval individual's ranking of which level of N they prefer may differ since
these two effects will vary in strength according to the level of N imposed.
Next is an interval of individuals (of length depending on N) that reside in
C1 when N=O but with zoning reside in C2. Individuals in the lower part of
this interval prefer some zoning to no zoning, whereas individuals in the
upper part of this interval are' worse off and prefer no zoning. This is to be
expected. If any individual that moves from C1 to C2 as a result of an N
increase is to be made worse off, it should be those with the highest income
level since these are the ones whose q,t tradeoff is most different from that
of the median voter in C2. Finally there is an interval of individuals (again
of varying length) who reside in C1 both before and after zoning is imposed.
For N sufficiently large, all of these individuals may be worse off, but for
smaller values of N the lower income individuals are worse off with zoning and
the higher income indHidusls sre better off with zoning. The lowest income
individuals who remain in C1 benefit from s possibly higher g but suffer from
low consumption because of the zoning constraint, Of course, all individuals
in C1 must purchase N units of housing, but the disutility from so doing is—27—
greater for the lower income individuala in C1.
In summary, the introduction of zoning tends to make the rich community
more exclusive, lowers utility of the poorest individuals and raiaea the
utility of the richest individuals. For individuals in the middle" of the
income distribution, however, welfare changes are not monotone in income. In
particular, a group of individuala that leave C1 are made better off at the
same time that a group of individuals that move to C2 and a group that remain
in C1 are made worae off.
4. Endogenous Zoning
The previous section treated M as an exogenous parameter and studied its
effect on the equilibrium. This section allows the zoning restriction to be
endogenously determined and illustrates the properties of equilibrium through
some examples. The game played by communities and individuals is accordingly
modified. As before, in the first stage, all individuals simultaneously
choose a community in which to reside. Once this choice is made, individuals
are unable to move in sny subsequent stage. Zn the second stage, individuals
in C1 determine a level of required housing N through a process of majority
voting. In the third stags, individuals in both communities choose tax rates,
also by majority voting, and individuals make their housing and consumption
purchases and obtain education.
4.1 Preliminary Anslysis:
Zn order to shed light on the general equilibrium analysis that follows,
it is useful to start by analyzing the problem of endogenoua zoning within a
simple, partial equilibrium context that allows us to highlight some of ita
main properties.-28—
Table 2 presenta information for the choices made by an individual with
income ç=12.9289 when this individual is able to dictate the choice of tax
rate and zoning level. In this one community example y=l0, the density has
support on (1,20], and NI indicates no zoning choice allowed, whereas Z
indicates theis able to zone. The subscripts indicate various intervals
of the income distribution: I (Identical) ,B(Bottom) ,TR(Top Truncated) ,T
(Top), and A (All) which correspond to the intervals (',] , [1,c.)[,l5J
(ç',2o] and [y,20] respectively.
As a first step, assume that all individuals are identical and have
income y: Note that, as illustrated in the second row of Table 2, were these
individuals able to choose a zoning level, they would choose N such thst
h)ir,)cN. A binding level of N would be chosen since, in its absence, the
equilibrium would be inefficient given that each individual's contribution to
the average housing demand is infinitesimal and hence housing demand is too
small,
If individuals are not identical, however, an additional consideration is
introduced. In particular, in the absence of zoning an individual with income
is making an implicit transfer to all individuals with income lowsr than
since these purchase less housing. Thus, as shown by the third and fourth
rows of Table 2,would choose to impose the same zoning level as before and
thus achieve the same allocation as with identical individuals.
Ifis faced with individuals with income greater than y, yet another
consideration is introduced. The desire for 'toenjoy an implicit transfer
from individuals witi' income strictly greater than .This,however, is
accomplished via the tax rate chosen, not the level of zoning, although of—29—
course, ss shown in the lest four rows of the table, there is an interaction
between the tax rate and the level of zoning chosen. Note that in the case TR
theindividual prefers some zoning even though they are at the bottom of
the income distribution and that the highest values of N result in cases I and
B. Another common feature is that when a binding zoning constraint is chosen,
the preferred tax rate also falls.
4.2 Equilibrium
As before, an equilibrium can be depicted graphically as the intersection
of two curves, W1(y) and W2(y), where W2(y) is unchanged and W1(y) is now
the utility obtained by an individual with income when residing in C1 given
that N, t and q are chosen according to the two-stage procedure outlined
above. Note that Proposition 5 implies that any equilibrium in which quality
differs across communities must be stratified. Furthermore, Proposition 4
implies that the third stage voting over tax rates results in a preferred tax
rate of the individual with median income. What differs from the previous
analysis is the addition of a stage in which individuals vote over the zoning
level N. In this stage individuals take as given the function t(yt;M) which
will determine tax rates in the third stage conditional on the level of N
chosen. The preferred level of N of an individual with income y is defined
by:
Max (21)
Assuming that ir and q are differentiable at the preferred pcxnt, the
first order condition for this problem is:—30—
-u(y-wh,h)hOir +v'(q)Oq if h>N C
ON ON
(22)
-u(y-irN,N) (MOe +11]+ u(y-1rNN)+v' (q)Oq if heN
ON ON
Figure 7 displays implied preferences over N for different levels of y as
wall as E and the implied quality as a function of N for the case of o-2,
y=.000i (as in the second panel of Table 1) when y=J.3.B. This example
illustrates two features. First, the preferences over N are not single peaked
and, second, the preferred value of N is not a monotone function of y. The
two highest incomes indicated on the diagram have preferred values of N that
lie to the left of the preferred value of N for yl7. As illustrated by the
tax and quality curves in the bottom panel, this preference for a lower N by
individuals with higher y indicates their preference for a higher tax rate and
higher quality.
Recall that preferences over tax rates for any given N are not generally
single peaked. Nonetheless, it was shown that a majority voting equilibrium
always exists and that the individual with median income was decisive, A
similar result is not available for the case of voting over N; it is easy to
provide examples in which the individual with median income is no longer the
decisive voter. In general there may be cases where a majority vote
equilibrium does not exist. Below we provide two examples where a majority
voting equilibriumdoes exist (though the decisive voter is not the one with
median income)
In particular, for each of the two specifications in Table 1 we have
computed the subqame perfect equilibrium for the three-stage game described—31—
above. The results appear in Table 3. In both caaea voting over H results in
a value auch that half the individuals have a preferred value of H no
greater than and half the individuals have a preferred value of H no less
than M. In both examples M* is smaller than the level of H preferred by the
individual whose income is median in C1.
A few points are worth noting about Table 3. In each case the
equilibrium has both higher tax rates and higher quality of public education
in C1, as is true in the equilibrium without zoning. Table 3 also indicatss
the degree to which the zoning restriction is binding for the boundary
individual and the individual with medisn income. In both examples a majority
of individuals are constrained. A comparison with Table 1 indicates how the
outcomes with endogenous zoning compare with those in which there is no
zoning. In particular, in each case the rich community becomes more
exclusive, and both the tax rate and the quality of public education increase
in both communities. The welfare analysis in the previous section indicates
the pattern of those whose utilities increase and decrease as a result of the
introduction of zoning.
s.conclusion
It is important to understand the role played by various factors in
generating the large disparities across communities in per student spending on
public education. Community zoning regulations undoubtedly affect this
outcome although just how zoning regulations interact with income
distribution, community composition, tax rates, and the provision of local
public goods is far from clear cx ante. This paper sims to provide some—32—
insights into these interactions by studying the effects of zoning in a two—
community model in which each community uses a local property tax to finance
public education. Tax rates are chosen by majority vote and individuals
decide in which community they wish to reside. We examine both the case of an
exogenously imposed zoning regulation as well as one which is determined
endogenously through majority vote at the community level.
Zoning affects outcomes through several channels. First, the imposition
of zoning changes the allocation of individuals across communities, thereby
affecting each community's distribution of income. Second, for a given
allocation of individuals, zoning affects the tax base available to that
community. Third, zoning affects the property tax chosen, via majority vote,
within a community.
Theoretical analysis indicates a wide range of possible effects.
Simulations revealed several interesting results. First, the rich community
becomes more exclusive, increasing mean income in both communities. Second,
the tax rate and quality increase in both communities under endogenous zoning
but not necessarily under exogenous zoning. Third, welfare effects are not
monotone in income. Although the richest people are made better off and the
poorest people sre made worse off, high income individuals in the poor
community are made better off and low income individuals in the rich community
ere made worse off. Fourth, zoning leads to greater spending per student in
the poor community, and may either increase or decrease the differences in the
quality of education across communities. Fifth, an individual's preferred
level of zoning is not monotone in her income. Thus majority voting over
zoning need not result in the preferred level of the individual with median
income.—33—
Many questions remain open to analysis. It would be of greatinterest to
change the form of the game analyzed so that individuals wereable to make use
of zoning (and taxea( directly as an instrument to attract certain segmentsof
the population or keep others out.16 The introduction of private schooling.
while it would complicate the analysis considerably, would also add greater
realism and thus prove to be of interest. Additional insights wouldbe gained
by allowing the number of communities to be determined endogenouslybut not
coatlessly.
16For a paper that uses thia alternative extensive form, see Epple and
Romer (199l(—34—
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1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8TABLE 1A
Total Spending ($)PerStudent for 1986—87 Academic Year
(Primary and Secondary Schooling)
Boston Area Detroit Area New York Area
Quincy 3,693 Dearborn 2,6814 Mount Vernon 6,328
Lynn 3,788 Highland Park 3,105 New York City 6,433
Somerville 4,693 East Detroit 3,740 Levittown 7,210
Maiden 4,820 Detroit 3,854 Baldwin 7,251
Jaltham 5,207 Pontiac 4,553 Hempstead 7,462
Newton 5,515 Royal Oak 5,172 New Rochelle7,970
Brookline 5,887 Grosse Pointe 5,705 Syosset 9,125
Boston 6,773 Birmingham 6,668 White Plains 11,045
Cambridge 7,244 Bloomfield Hills 6,976 Great Neck 12,868
Source: 1987 Census of GovernmentsTABLE 1
(i)o—10 i—1X10






** ** * ** **
Yb q1 t1 q2 t2l Yl P2 Y2-
M—0 2.364.382.92 .28 .438.277.56 1.701.61
M—1 5.806.454.23 .98 .96 10.53 9.96 3.282.82
M—2 13.87 11.425.642.641.71 15.91 15.67 6.346.55
M—5 15.009.351.872.811.76 16.67 16.46 6.694.68







t q N h(w,y) V(r,q,yM)
1.11 4.02 — 3.64 1.4288
.99 4.30 4.32 3.79 1.4346
NZB 1.19 3.68 — 3.53 1.4178
Z .99 4.30 4.32 3.79 1.4346
NZTR 1.07 4.23 — 3.69 1.4347
ZTR 1.04 4.27 4.08 3.73 1.4349
NZT 1.01 4.50 — 3.78 1.4420
Z.r 1.01 4.50 0 3.78 1.4420
NZA 1.09 4.11 — 3.66 1.4314
ZA 1.02 4.38 4.12 3.76 1.4376TABLE 3
Example1 Example 2
18.0B 13.90
1.23 2.09
13.07 5.37
2.54 1.71
16.19 11.36
3.93 2.64
h(w,y) 1.17 1.69
1.21 1.91